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The activities of bodies regulating sport activity have gained in both prominence and 
significance in recent years. There has been a similar growth in legal engagement with 
sport and its regulation and in the practice and study of sports law. These trends are, in no 
small part, driven by the heightened commercial significance of sport, to the individuals 
and organisations regulated, to the regulators themselves and to an ever broadening range 
of stakeholders. 
 
The modern position of sports governing bodies represents a significant shift from their 
mid-nineteenth century origins – formed as genuinely self-regulatory coalitions of 
athletes, with the purpose of facilitating competition in each sport.1 This metamorphosis 
– taking sport from amateur, ‘club’ governance to high levels of formal organisation, 
sophisticated regulatory codes and structures, corporatisation and commodification – 
represents a fundamental transformation of these bodies from their Victorian origins.2 
 
In the modern era sports governing bodies occupy an important niche within society; 
quite aside from their economic prominence, they control access to important aspects of 
social life and have significant capacity to impact both livelihoods and reputations. Sports 
bodies wield extensive powers, whether it be the capacity to label an athlete3 as a “drugs 
cheat”,4 to classify their behaviour as racist,5 or restrict freedom of expression in the 
∗ I would like to thank Gary Wilson and Tom Lewis for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
article. I wish also to thank the editor of Public Law, Professor Maurice Sunkin, and the anonymous 
reviewer for their constructive comments and recommendations. Any errors or omissions remain my own. 
1 R. Hutchinson, Empire Games: The British Invention of Twentieth Century Sport (Edinburgh & London: 
Mainstream, 1996), p.58. 
2 M. Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp.73, 86-88. 
3 The term “athlete” is used throughout to denote participants in sport. 
4 e.g. Article 10.2 World Anti-Doping Code (2015). 
5 Football Association Regulatory Commission, The Football Association v John George Terry (2012) 4 
October. 
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sporting arena.6 Though most prominent legal disputes tend to arise in the context of elite 
sport – often as a result of significant financial consequences – the importance of sport, 
both to individuals7 and to society as a whole,8 is great. Sport plays a significant role as a 
policy instrument in pursuit of, for example, public health goals,9 and – at an elite level – 
as a means by which to project political ideology and promote national standing.10 As 
such the extent to which sports governing bodies are accountable through law for their 
rules and decisions is of significant contemporary interest. The issues arising in the 
context of sport are, too, of wider significance. Many, if not all, have resonance in 
judicial scrutiny of other arenas, for instance, that of clubs, trade unions and political 
parties, as well as other self-regulating sectors.11  
 
This article assesses the English courts’ role in securing appropriate levels of 
accountability. It commences with a brief summary of the development of judicial 
scrutiny of sports governing bodies and the contemporary approach. The main body of 
the article develops a critique of this position, highlighting, in particular, the weak 
substantive judicial scrutiny of sports governing body decisions and actions, and the 
limited scope for review of the rules and regulations of those organisations. The case for 
reform is then set out, driven by considerations relating to the nature and context of the 
powers exercised, an examination of judicial attitudes, and the wider impact of judicial 
scrutiny of sports governing bodies. This underpins the central claim of the article, that 
the principle of proportionality offers an important means by which these challenges can 
be addressed.  
 
History 
6 Football Association Regulatory Commission, The Football Association v Rio Ferdinand (Queens Park 
Rangers FC) (2014) 15 October. 
7 J. Lord and M. Stein, “Social rights and the relational value of the rights to participate in sport, recreation 
and play” (2009) 27 Boston University International Law Journal 249. 
8 G. Jarvie with J. Thornton, Sport, Culture and Society, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2012). 
9 L. Donaldson, “Sport and exercise: the public health challenge” (2000) 34(6) British Journal of Sports 
Medicine 409. 
10 S. Jackson and S. Haigh, Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World (London: Routledge, 2009); 
see also Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (No 1) [1985] 2 NZLR 159, 179. 
11 See, respectively, the examples of Colgan v Kennel Club (2001) Unreported, 26 October; Breen v 
Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175; Evangelou v McNicol [2016] EWCA Civ 817; and 
Ghosh v General Medial Council [2001] 1 WLR 1915. 
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 The history of legal scrutiny of the rules and decisions of sports governing bodies is 
relatively short. The first noteworthy indication that an English court might be minded to 
make a meaningful intervention did not come until the late 1940s, with Denning L.J.’s 
dissenting judgment in Russell v Duke of Norfolk.12 His Lordship noted that the Jockey 
Club had, “a monopoly in an important field of human activity. It has great powers and 
corresponding responsibilities.”13 Denning L.J. took the view that in a case with such 
serious consequences – removing a person’s livelihood – there existed an obligation to 
act in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Prior to this there had existed little 
indication of any judicial appetite for intervention in sports regulation on any grounds.14  
 
This judgment proved prophetic and reflected a broader shift towards accountability of 
sports governing bodies on the bases of the rules of natural justice and on that of ultra 
vires founded on a body’s rules and regulations.15 The justiciability of the decisions of 
governing bodies was affirmed in Baker v Jones, establishing the contractual nature of 
the relationship between sports governing bodies and those they regulate.16 Denning L.J. 
further strengthened this approach in Enderby Town FC v Football Association Ltd,17 
overriding an ouster clause by which the Football Association purported to make its own 
decisions final and impervious to judicial scrutiny. 
 
One early judicial intervention in the regulatory affairs of sports governing bodies 
remains the most extensive. Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd18 represents 
the high watermark of English judicial intervention in sport’s self-regulation.19 Eastham 
12 [1949] 1 All ER 109. 
13 At 119. 
14 See M. McKee, “Boxing Clever: The Development of Legal Control over Administrative Decision-
making in British Sports Associations” (1989) 6(1) International Journal of the History of Sport 88 at 92-
95. 
15 For an assessment of the development of the law in this regard see, M. Beloff, Michael “Pitch, Pool, 
Rink…Court? Judicial Review in the Sporting World” (1989) P.L 95; P. Morris and G. Little ‘Challenging 
Sports Bodies Determinations’ (1998) 17 C.J.Q. 128. 
16 [1954] 2 All ER 553. 
17 [1971] 1 Ch 591. 
18 [1963] 3 All ER 139. 
19 See S. Boyes, ‘Eastham v Newcastle United’ in J. Anderson (eds) Landmark Cases and Decisions in 
Sports Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2013). 
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marks a significant departure from the preceding case law, which was limited to 
consideration of matters of natural justice and vires decisions. Eastham was not so 
limited. Because Eastham’s challenge was premised on the restraint of trade doctrine – 
which outlaws the imposition of unreasonable economic restraints between private 
parties, howsoever effected – the High Court was able to scrutinise the validity of the 
rules of the Football Association and the Football League themselves. Eastham 
challenged the reasonableness of football’s ‘retain and transfer’ system. Under the 
scheme a professional footballer could be ‘retained’ by the club holding his registration – 
and thus be unable to sign for and take up employment with another club – even when the 
contract under which the retaining club employed him had expired. The High Court 
decision, that these rules were indeed unduly restrictive and thus unlawful, is a rare and 
notable instance of the striking down of a sports regulatory scheme. 
 
Though the restraint of trade doctrine has been applied since, Eastham remains the most 
significant judicial intercession into sport’s regulatory affairs.  
 
The modern law 
 
Determining justiciability 
 
Much of the modern case law concerns justiciability and the legal basis of claims against 
sports governing bodies. This despite the recognition that the basis of the relationship 
between sports governing bodies and those regulated by them was to be regarded as 
contractual. This stems in large part from the Court of Appeal decision in Law v National 
Greyhound Racing Club.20 In Law the Court rejected the governing body’s application to 
strike out – on grounds of abuse of process – a greyhound trainer’s challenge to a 
disciplinary sanction imposed upon him, made by way of a claim for breach of contract. 
Law has proven to be an authority of far greater significance than might initially have 
been imagined. This essentially positive decision – that arguments of abuse of process 
could not be deployed as a means of shielding the Club from scrutiny – has had a 
20 [1983] 3 All ER 300. 
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significant limiting influence on the body of case law where claimants have sought 
judicial review of sports governing bodies.21 
 
Law was a significant authority in the resolution of a series of attempts to subject sports 
governing bodies to judicial review. This well documented chain of cases came about 
principally as a consequence of the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v City Panel on 
Take Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin,22 which encouraged the view that sport’s self-
regulatory bodies might be considered amenable to judicial review. Each was ultimately 
decided to be inadmissible on the basis that the relationship between the regulator and 
regulatee was certainly consensual, if not necessarily contractual in nature and this has 
been the settled view since.23 Though there were a variety of approaches adopted, the 
authority established by the Court of Appeal in Law was, in each case, a key factor. 
 
This position would not necessarily have been problematic – the contractual approach 
was applied sufficiently generously to cover most situations, even those where the 
contractual nexus was significantly stretched. However, in Modahl v British Athletics 
Federation (No. 2)24 the Court of Appeal struggled to reconcile the relationship between 
the parties with the law relating to implied contracts. Latham and Mance L.JJ laboured to 
the conclusion that such a connection existed, but in his dissenting judgment Jonathan 
Parker L.J. did not accept the existence of a contractual link. This reflected the earlier 
view of Lord Denning M.R. in Enderby Town, describing such contracts as, “a fiction … 
created by lawyers to give the courts jurisdiction”.25  
 
21 See J. Anderson, “An Accident of History: Why the Decisions of Sports Governing Bodies are not 
Amenable to Judicial Review” (2006) 35(3) Common Law World 173. 
22 [1987] 1 All ER 564. 
23 R v Football Association of Wales, ex parte Flint Town Football Club [1991] COD 44; R v Disciplinary 
Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207; R v Jockey Club, ex 
parte RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225; R v Football Association Ltd, ex parte Football League 
Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833; R v Jockey Club, ex parte Aha Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909. Note, though, the 
position adopted in other jurisdictions, notably France, where sports governing bodies’ actions are 
considered as administrative acts and subject to public law procedures. See generally, R. van Kleef, 
“Reviewing Diciplinary Sanctions in Sport” (2015) 4(1) Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 3. 
24 [2002] 1 WLR 1192. 
25 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591, at 606. 
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The doubts created by Modahl were resolved by the judgment of Richards J., invoking 
the approach advocated by Professor Dawn Oliver,26 in Bradley v Jockey Club, 
subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal. The judgments in Bradley recognised a 
private law supervisory jurisdiction, irrespective of the existence of a contract.27 In 
acknowledging this jurisdiction, Richards J drew upon Lord Denning’s judgment in 
Nagle v Feilden, that organisations with “predominant power” over a sector would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts as a matter of public policy.28 
 
The supervisory jurisdiction appeared, from Bradley, to be engaged only in cases where a 
person’s right to work is threatened,29 but is now more widely applicable following the 
judgment of Stanley Burnton J. in a further claim against the Jockey Club, Mullins v 
McFarlane.30 In Mullins it was regarded as sufficient that the matters of concern to the 
claimant were of “importance”.31 
 
It should also be noted that there exists a further potential route by which the courts may 
scrutinise sports governing bodies: competition law. Like the restraint of trade doctrine, 
statutory competition law provisions establish cause of actions arising out of the 
economic relationship between the parties. Where an anti-competitive arrangement or 
abuse of dominant market position arises, there is the potential for litigants to invoke 
these provisions.32 English courts have been required to engage with these measures only 
infrequently in the context of sport;33 largely due to a prevalence of cross-border issues 
which has meant that recourse to European Union competition measures has 
predominated.34 
 
26 D. Oliver, “Common values in public and private law and the public/private divide” [1997] P.L. 630. 
27 [2004] EWHC Civ 2164; [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. 
28 [1966] 2 QB 633 at 647. 
29 [2004] EWHC Civ 2164, at [35]. 
30 [2006] EWHC 986 (QB) at [39]; though cf Chambers v British Olympic Association [2008] EWHC 2028 
(QB) suggesting that this jurisdiction only extended to “right to work” cases. 
31 At [40]  
32 Respectively ss 2 and 18 Competition Act 1998 
33 See, for example, Hendry v World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd  [2002] UKCLR 5 
34 See, for example, Case C-529/04 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR 
I-6991 
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The generous attitude to justiciability is tempered somewhat by a growing judicial 
preference for self-regulatory solutions to disputes. This judicial inclination is made 
manifest in recent cases concerning sports arbitration. In Stretford v Football 
Association35 it was argued that a forced arbitration clause was a breach of the right to a 
fair hearing and of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. At first 
instance and on appeal the claim was rejected. Notably, both courts refused to accept the 
argument that the adhesionary nature of the arbitration clause rendered the rule 
illegitimate. 
 
More recent cases have determined that a disciplinary process of a sports governing body 
may be legitimately classified as an arbitration for the purposes of the Arbitration Act 
1996, without explicit agreement to this effect between the parties;36 and that such 
proceedings could only be successfully challenged in court on the basis of a serious 
irregularity or error of law on the part of the arbitral body.37  
 
The result of this judicial predilection is that many cases which might otherwise be 
litigated are channelled away into arbitrations. Though in Enderby Town Lord Denning 
rejected the capacity of sports governing bodies to oust overtly the courts’ jurisdiction, it 
may well be that the arbitration clause is just as effective in limiting judicial scrutiny. The 
limited review capacity afforded national courts may force a claimant down a lengthy 
process to obtain in-depth, substantive, judicial consideration of their case.38 It is the case 
that issues of great significance might be regarded as non-arbitrable as being beyond the 
capacity of the arbitral body, but establishing this could, in itself, be a costly and time 
consuming exercise for would-be litigants, with no guarantee of success.39 An in-depth 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but it is nonetheless clear that 
35 [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch), [2007] EWCA Civ 238. 
36 England and Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Danish Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm); Baker v British 
Boxing Board of Control [2015] EWHC 2469 (Ch). 
37 Danish Kaneria v England and Wales Cricket Board Ltd [2014] EWHC 1348 (Comm); Arbitration Act 
1996 ss 68-69 
38 See e.g. Case 40575/10 Adrian Mutu v Switzerland, Case 67474/10 Claudia Pechstein v Switzerland, 
pending before the European Court of Human Rights at the time of writing. 
39 See e.g. Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards and The Football Association Premier League Ltd 
[2010] EWHC 3111 (Ch). 
 
 
7 
                                       
the growth of arbitration has had a significant influence in diverting cases away from the 
courts. 
 
Putting aside for one moment the arbitration issue, while the decision in Bradley, taken 
along with the contractual, restraint of trade and competition law approaches, appears on 
its face it to offer broad access to court for would-be litigants, it does not address the 
nature and extent of the scrutiny as exercised through the principles and remedies 
deployed. 
 
Substantive law 
 
Focus on jurisdictional issues in challenges to sports governing bodies has deflected 
attention from in-depth consideration of applicable principle. However, it is well 
established that sports governing bodies may act only intra vires, in a manner consistent 
with their own regulatory frameworks, and within the general objectives of the 
organisation. It may also be possible for sports regulators to behave unlawfully where 
account is taken of irrelevant factors or, conversely, they fail to take account of relevant 
matters.40  
 
The decisions in Bradley also identified the applicability of proportionality in such cases. 
Richards J. decided that, subject to falling within a “range of reasonable responses”, a 
decision of a sports governing body will not be regarded as unlawful.41 Though, as is 
discussed below, the intensity of this scrutiny is at a low level. 
 
As established in Eastham, the restraint of trade doctrine allows for more searching 
scrutiny than the contractual/supervisory approach. This manifests itself in two respects. 
First, the doctrine permits the court to assess the legitimacy of the regulatory framework 
itself, as well measures adopted there under. Second, it involves a test of reasonableness 
which engages the court in a balancing exercise between the aim pursued and the 
40 Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2010 (QB). 
41 At [43]. 
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measure deployed; as such the doctrine involves much more intense scrutiny than the 
assessment of ultra vires and restrictive approach to proportionality in the 
contract/supervisory context. A similar type of analysis is facilitated by competition law. 
These are both, though, limited to economic restrictions. 
 
It is similarly well established that sports governing bodies are compelled to act in 
accordance with the rules of natural justice and there has been no judicial hesitation in 
regarding them as being, in principle, accountable on this basis. Both limbs of the rules of 
natural justice – the right to a fair hearing and the rule against bias – have been deployed 
in the judicial scrutiny of sports governing bodies.42  
 
Assessing the modern law 
 
On its face the adoption of a judicial review-like private law process appears to represent 
a satisfactory solution to the problematic issue of judicial scrutiny of sports governing 
bodies. The uncertainty as to the appropriate claim to be made having been set aside, the 
path to judicial resolution of disputes is now clear. 
 
Despite rejecting the applicability of judicial review, the courts have, nonetheless, 
imported the principles applied therein into cases where a contractual or public policy 
based private law supervisory jurisdiction is invoked. Indeed, it has been made plain that 
there exists an expectation that there will be a significant transplantation of public law 
principles into the private law context: 
 
“I would consider it surprising and unsatisfactory if a private law claim in relation 
to the decision of a domestic body required the court to adopt a materially 
different approach from a judicial review claim in relation to the decision of a 
public body.”43 
 
42 See S. Gardiner et al, Sports Law, 4th edn (London: Routledge, 2011) at pp.127-134. 
43 [2004] EWHC Civ 2164 (QB), at [37], per Richards J. 
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However, it having been determined that sports governing bodies are not to be regarded 
as public bodies, amenable to the claim for judicial review – that they are different 
creatures – it is logical to conclude that the adoption of a judicial review-like approach 
should be open to scrutiny. It is, by extension, arguable that the principles deployed 
through judicial review are not necessarily compatible or their application justifiable. The 
topography of judicial review is, naturally, the product of the environment in which it has 
developed and is usually deployed. As a consequence the principles established therein 
are not of necessity suitable for the new task to which they have been put. Indeed, Rose J. 
made this plain in his judgment in R v Football Association Ltd, ex parte Football League 
Ltd: 
 
“[F]or my part, to apply to the governing body of football … principles honed for 
the control of the abuse of power by government and its creatures, would involve 
what, in today’s fashionable parlance would be called a quantum leap.”44 
 
These competing perspectives suggest a tension. The characteristics of sports governing 
bodies are regarded as worlds away from those of genuinely public bodies, but are 
considered materially similar for the purposes of the application of principle. 
 
On that basis it is appropriate to consider, necessarily briefly, the rationale underpinning 
the claim for judicial review. This is contested ground,45 however, whether one 
subscribes to the ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ or ‘common law’ accounts, it is reasonable 
to summarise to the effect that constitutional considerations drive a form of intervention 
limited to the maintenance of legality.46 Equally, the constitutional context empowers 
judges to constrain government in order to secure this legality. 
 
As sports governing bodies are not considered to be public bodies it must also follow that 
these constitutional concerns are not necessarily relevant to them and permits the 
44 [1993] 2 All ER 833 at 848. 
45 See J. Jowell, “Of vires and vacuums: the constitutional context of judicial review” [1999] P.L. 448. 
46 See T. Allan, “Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review” [2003] 23(4) O.J.L.S. 
563. 
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possibility that a different approach is appropriate, presenting a challenge to the 
wholesale adoption of a judicial review-style approach. 
 
There may too be private law limitations on substantive intervention in the rules and 
decisions of sports governing bodies in which a court will not intervene. It is certainly the 
case that the law of contract creates a ‘space’ in which private parties can construct 
agreements tailored to their own ends. Such agreements are not unconstrained, they are 
subject to the formalities of the creation of the contractual arrangement and the statutory 
and common law limitations as to the circumstances in which a contractual relationship 
may be created, what may be included in it and result from it.47 The reality is that these 
do not impose extensive demands on the substance of a contract where the nature of the 
contract is regulatory in nature. In this context, in essence, the courts’ role is that of 
patrolling the limits of the contractual space, with relatively few opportunities to 
intervene in substantive matters.48 Thus the court will ensure that the rules – as the terms 
of the contract – are observed, but will stop short of scrutiny of the rules themselves in 
most situations. These boundaries might be legitimately characterised as being just as 
generous, if not more so, as those effected under the public law approach. 
 
These broad public-private parallels could reasonably be interpreted as imposing severe 
limits on the scope of this discussion. If the nature of judicial intervention in the public 
and private spheres is broadly comparable, then it might legitimately be questioned quite 
why judicial oversight of these bodies could be regarded as being in some way 
unsatisfactory. The response to this is to highlight that, in the same way as they do not 
‘fit’ in the public law sphere, these bodies are not easily accommodated in private law. 
Lord Denning, in Enderby Town, observed the “fictional” nature of the ‘contractual’ 
relationship between sports governing bodies and their regulatees, noting that rules are 
legislative in nature: adhesionary, take-it-or-leave-it arrangements presented by a 
monopolist.49  
 
47 See, for example, Part 1 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; Part 1 Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
48 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) p.57. 
49 At 606. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from this is that sports governing bodies fall into neither the 
public law or private law rationales governing judicial intervention with any degree of 
comfort.50 The judicial stationing of these public/private hybrids in the sphere of private 
law might be regarded as a matter of judicial convenience, preferring to deal in the more 
flexible environs offered there in contrast to the more constitutionally sensitive public 
law domain.  
 
That sports governing bodies inhabit this grey zone overlapping or in between the 
public/private divide is not in itself grounds to criticise judicial approaches to their 
scrutiny. However, it lends legitimacy an assessment of judicial attitudes and supports the 
claim that the uncritical deployment of either the public or private approach to 
intervention is unsatisfactory. While the adoption of either approach might be regarded as 
justifiable, a more clear articulation of the rationale for doing so is needed. Recognition 
of this hybrid position highlights and permits consideration of two significant 
problematic issues in the judicial scrutiny of sports governing bodies. 
 
Limited substantive review of sports governing bodies’ rules 
 
The first issue is the self-imposed judicial limitation on scrutiny of the rules and 
regulations of these bodies. While assessment of the consistency and ‘reasonableness’ of 
decisions is well established there are few, if any, examples of judicial scrutiny of the 
substance of the rules themselves, save for the protection of economic rights in the 
application of the restraint of trade doctrine and competition law provisions to sports 
rules and regulations.51 This, I argue, is a consequence of the adoption of a judicial 
review-style approach. In the context of judicial review constitutional demands 
effectively proscribe judicial scrutiny of primary legislation. Indeed, when considering 
50 On the public/private divide see, Lord Woolf, “Public law – private law: why the divide? – a personal 
view” [1986] P.L. 220; G. Borrie, “The Regulation of Public and Private Power” [1989] P.L. 552; 
D.Oliver, op cit n. 26. 
51 An example of such a rule being struck down is to be found in the appeal panel decision in, In the matter 
of an appeal pursuant to paragraph 3.11 of the PGB minimum standards criteria involving London Welsh 
Rugby Football Club Limited and The Rugby Union and Newcastle Falcons Rugby Football Club, 29 June 
2012. 
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the exercise of executive power judicial review is specifically limited to scrutiny of the 
scope and proper exercise of that power, and not of the validity of the power itself. The 
simple transplantation of this approach from the public law sphere into private law cases 
involving the activities of sports governing bodies has the consequence that such 
regulatory schemes are largely untouchable by the judiciary. 
 
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it permits these organisations, to 
operate monopolistic, adhesionary regulatory regimes, which hold a significant place in 
society and in the life of many individuals, largely free of constraint. While it is true that 
abuses of economic power will fall to be considered under the auspices of the restraint of 
trade doctrine or statutory competition law provisions, the social and personal aspects of 
their sphere of control are, at best, only lightly supervised. This is a particular problem 
because the ‘legislators’ in the sports governing bodies are not subject to the same level 
of democratic accountability as Parliament. Though the ability to call legislators to 
account at the ballot box is a blunt instrument at best, no such democratic legitimacy is 
present in the case of most sports governing bodies. Though they are often described as 
self-regulatory – a term which asserts at least an element of accountability to regulated 
parties – the reality is that these bodies are better characterised as ‘decentred’ 
regulators.52 This problem is exacerbated by the ‘capture’ of the regulator by strong 
interests groups within a sport. This is exemplified by recent Parliamentary reports into 
the regulation of football in England – highlighting the dominance of the Premier League 
in the institutional structures of the Football Association – which has resulted in sustained 
criticism and calls for legislative intervention.53 This apparent disenfranchisement means 
that greater emphasis falls on judicial processes in securing participants’ input into, and 
scrutiny of, ‘their’ self-regulated activity. 
 
This lack of reflexivity is exacerbated by the fact that many of the rules and regulations 
adopted by sports governing bodies at a domestic level are not of their own creation; 
52 J. Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory” World’ [2001] 54 C.L.P. 103. 
53 House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2012-13) Football Governance Follow-Up: 
Volume 1. HC 509, p.26. 
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instead they are mandated by the international body responsible for the regulation of a 
particular sport.54 Even then the sport’s international regulator may have such 
requirements imposed from outside, the requirement of the International Olympic 
Committee that Olympic sports subscribe to the World Anti-Doping Code, for example.55 
 
Where regulatory schemes have been judicially evaluated, individual cases have been met 
with a conservative response. This has been the case whether the claimants have sought 
to vindicate rights under statutory provision – most notably equalities legislation56 – or 
through claims founded in restraint of trade. In respect of the latter, in Stevenage Borough 
FC v Football League, Carnwath J. shifted the burden of proof onto the claimant, on the 
basis that the challenge was brought to the rules and regulations deployed in the public 
interest which were, on this reasoning, to be treated in a manner akin to those of a public 
body.57 
 
The result of all this is that sports governing bodies are relatively unconstrained in their 
rule-making activities. Though rules in breach of restraint of trade and competition law 
measures have been and will be struck down, there are few, if any, examples of 
successful challenges to the rules of sports governing bodies on the basis of 
contract/private law supervisory jurisdiction. 
 
Weak substantive review of sports governing bodies’ actions  
 
Beyond the level of rule-validity, the second major concern raised by judicial treatment 
of sports governing bodies is the ‘light touch’ approach to decisions made under the 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
54 See e.g. Cooke v Football Association (1972) The Times, 24 March. 
55 Olympic Charter, Rule 40. 
56 See e.g. Bennett v Football Association (1978) Court of Appeal, 28 July, Transcript No. 591; S. Patel, 
Inclusion and Exclusion in Competitive Sport: Socio-legal and regulatory perspectives (Oxford: Routledge, 
2015), Chapter 4. 
57 (1996) The Times, 1 August. 
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In sports cases refusal to intervene, or limited intervention, has frequently been on the 
basis of specialist, often technical, knowledge and that a court is ill-suited to closely 
assessing such decisions.58 However, such an approach cannot justify a blanket approach 
to every aspect of a regulator’s activity. It is, nonetheless, inherent in two prominent 
cases. In both Bradley and Fallon the courts emphasised the expert nature of the 
respective regulators.59 The expertise of the governing body was also invoked by Lord 
Denning MR in Enderby Town, suggesting that a specialist sports tribunal may be better 
placed to deliver justice than a court of law.60 In McInnes v Onslow-Fane, Megarry V-C 
made this position plain: 
 
“I think that the courts must be slow to allow any obligation to be fair to be used 
as a means of bringing before the courts for review honest decisions of bodies 
exercising jurisdiction over sporting and other activities, which those bodies are 
far better fitted to judge than the courts”61 
 
This rationale was similarly deployed in Stevenage and formed part of the reasoning 
behind Carnwath J’s decision, noted above, to reverse the proof burden usual in restraint 
of trade cases. 
 
A second strand of reasoning – the desire not to frustrate activities carried out in the 
public interest – has also driven the low-intensity approach. In Stevenage Carnwath J. 
determined that this would limit challenges to instances of “arbitrary or capricious” 
behaviour or the existence of a “pernicious monopoly”. This was also made out in stark 
terms by Lord Woolf MR in Wilander v Tobin, a challenge by two professional tennis 
players to a ban imposed for infringements of anti-doping rules: 
 
58 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice, (Oxford: OUP, 
1999) p.132. 
59 Bradley at [26], Fallon at [63]. 
60 At 605. 
61 [1978] 1 WLR 1520 at 1535. Author’s emphasis. 
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“While the courts must be vigilant to protect the genuine rights of sportsmen … 
they must be equally vigilant in preventing the court’s procedures being used 
unjustifiably to render perfectly sensible and fair procedures inoperable.”62 
 
This echoes the earlier view of Megarry V-C in McInnes v Onslow Fane: 
 
“Bodies such as the [British Boxing Board of Control], which promote a public 
interest by seeking to maintain high standards in a field of activity which might 
otherwise become degraded and corrupt, ought not to be hampered in their work 
without good cause.”63 
 
Both acknowledgement of expertise and a desire to limit the impact of any intervention 
based on public interest considerations evidence a significant degree of judicial 
reluctance to engage to any great extent with the affairs of sports governing bodies.  
 
This is evident, too, in the application of the proportionality principle in sports cases; 
though it should be noted that there has been little opportunity for the approach to be 
fully developed. However, where it has been considered, application of the 
proportionality principle has not been elucidated in any detail and has not – explicitly at 
least – taken account of the various approaches to the test established by the general 
jurisprudence, perhaps most notably that developed in, and following on from, Huang v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.64 
 
In Bradley, the High Court did not itself assess the proportionality of the Jockey Club 
Appeal Panel determination but, instead, chose to consider whether the application of the 
proportionality principle by the Panel was reasonable. In making this assessment the 
Court was, in essence, making an inquiry as to whether the Panel’s approach to 
proportionality fell within a range of reasonable responses in that it was one which a 
reasonable panel might have reached – proportionality viewed through the lens of 
62 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s LR 293 at 301. 
63 Op cit at 1535. See also Baker v British Boxing Board of Control [2015] EWHC 2469 (Ch) at [20]-[22]. 
64 [2007] UKHL 11 at [19]. 
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irrationality. Again, this approach was explained by reference to the desire not to usurp 
the function of the primary decision-maker. 
 
By contrast, in Fallon, a much more direct assessment of the proportionality of the 
Horseracing Regulatory Authority Panel’s decision was evident. Davis J. undertook an 
overt balancing exercise between the competing interests of the parties – the detrimental 
effect on Fallon – in terms of participation and reputation – weighed against the potential 
harm to perceptions of the integrity and reputation of the sport. Despite the more direct 
nature of the evaluation, the judgment is not cast in the language of proportionality, nor 
does it adopt the very clear structure of the tests outlined below. 
 
Arguably, both restraint of trade and competition law cases can involve a form of 
proportionality test – weighing up the interests of the parties, and of the ‘public interest’ 
in determining the legitimacy of a decision or rule. However, it must be noted that both 
apply only in the where significant economic implications arise. 
 
The case for reform 
 
There is therefore a claim to be made in favour of reform in order to address the concerns 
outlined here. There are six broad, interrelated grounds for this. 
 
First, sports governing bodies exercise monopoly power over individuals and other 
stakeholders, including, in some cases, powers analogous to those ordinarily exercised by 
state bodies.65 Indeed, in some respects, they effectively displace the activities of the state 
where their disciplinary processes result in a rolling-back of the reach of the criminal and 
civil law.66 In this context, and others, sports governing bodies have effectively become a 
65 R. Ellickson, “When Civil Society Uses an Iron Fist: The Roles of Private Associations in Rulemaking 
and Adjudication” [2016] American Law and Economics Review 1  
66 See, in particular, the judgment of Lord Woolf C.J. in R v Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246 at [5] and 
the Crown Prosecution Service/National Police Chiefs’ Council/Football Association/Football Association 
of Wales (2015) Agreement on the handling of incidents falling under both criminal and football regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
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proxy for the state or delegated “deputy regulator”67 – perhaps even stretching to their 
enrolment by the state.68 Where evidence exists of the exercise of public power by sports 
governing bodies, it is plainly arguable that they should be accountable on the same basis 
as ‘pure’ public bodies; indeed there may be a more persuasive claim given the lack of 
alternative avenues of accountability. This approach may militate a closer scrutiny of 
some aspects of sports governing bodies’ activities, but clearly not all elements will be 
considered to be ‘public’. However, the claim to greater intensity of scrutiny can be 
extended beyond this, premised on the adhesionary character of sports governing bodies’ 
rules and regulations. I argue that the take-it-or-leave-it nature of sports governing 
bodies’ regulatory schemes mandates closer judicial scrutiny when coupled with 
significant consequences for regulated parties.69 In particular this is because the relative 
power of the parties means that those subject to the regulations have little or no capacity 
to effectively negotiate its terms.70 Admittedly there exists no practical scope for such 
negotiation between the regulators and regulated on an individual basis – to do so would 
result in chaos and render the activity ungovernable – but the engagement in collective 
bargaining of the sort prevalent in American major league sport would go some way to 
ameliorating this concern. In engaging in more intensive scrutiny a court would be able to 
re-balance the interests of the parties in a way which overcomes the limitations created by 
the adhesionary regulatory scheme. In this regard greater judicial scrutiny has the 
capacity to meet concerns premised both on the impact of the powers exercised and the 
power imbalance between the parties. 
 
Second, despite the monopolistic, adhesionary and far-reaching nature of these – often 
partly quasi-public – regulatory regimes, there is an absence of other mechanisms of 
accountability. Many public bodies, if not all, are the subject of much greater intensity of 
scrutiny, from a significantly wider range of agents. Public bodies are likely to encounter 
challenges from Parliament and its Select Committees, from ombudsmen and other state-
67 Collins p. 219. 
68 J. Black, “Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation” 
[2003] P.L. 63; see e.g. Massingberd Mundy at 219 per Neill L.J., Aga Khan at 916 per Bingham M.R. 
69 C. Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance” 
[2002] 24(1) Journal of Law and Society 56, 63. 
70 N. Duxbury, “Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force” [1990] 53 M.L.R. 421, 434-437. 
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backed complaints mechanisms and from, for example, the National Audit Office.71 
Sports governing bodies – usually constituted as corporate bodies of one form or another 
– face little comparable scrutiny. Though this accountability vacuum might not compel a 
court to exercise more intensive scrutiny, it should be regarded as counterbalancing the 
worry of being unduly burdensome given the absence of these other demands to 
accountability.  
 
Third, the law as it stands suffers from substantial internal inconsistency. The pattern 
evident from the case law is that economic rights command high levels of protection from 
the courts, while other values such as participation, reputation, status, social inclusion and 
psychological well-being rarely, if ever, fall for meaningful consideration. Though these 
values underpin the rationale for the extension of jurisdiction, it is unusual for them to be 
remedied or even recognised in the subsequent substantive analysis. The result is internal 
inconsistency; it is clearly arguable that interests acknowledged as sufficiently important 
to drive the recognition of a specific jurisdiction based on public policy must, as a matter 
of logic, fall for consideration and evaluation in the substantive analysis of such cases. 
Indeed, the rationale for the extension of jurisdiction appears fatally flawed if the values 
which underpin it are not, in the pinch, even considered. 
 
Fourth, the reticence of the courts to exercise higher intensity review is premised on 
misplaced assumptions about the function of the court in these situations, and a 
misconceived assessment of their own capacity and expertise. It is arguable that this 
comes about, at least in part, because of the acknowledged ‘borrowing’ from public law 
in subjecting sports governing bodies to scrutiny. In characterising the scrutiny process as 
being substantially similar to judicial review, there has been a failure to recognise that 
decisions about the ‘proper’ role of the court in judicial review are inevitably 
characterised by judicial restraint – that is self-limitation of action premised on 
71 See D. Oliver, “Regulation, Democracy, and Democratic Oversight in the UK” in D. Oliver, T. Prosser 
and R. Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
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constitutional principle.72 Such a limitation is inherent in the law of contract too – the 
role of the court is usually to enforce the terms, not to adjust or amend them – but it is 
clear that the law of contract is capable of adapting to permit greater intervention in 
particular social and economic contexts.73 In the private law supervisory jurisdiction in 
which sports governing bodies sit it seems that this residue of restraint remains. This is 
clearly not as a consequence of constitutional considerations, but through recognition that 
there is a public interest in not imposing too great a burden on regulators. This 
conservative attitude appears to go hand in glove with the application of a judicial 
deference approach in sports cases – relating to the capacity of the court to adjudicate in 
respect of matters going to expertise or specialist knowledge. In reality the ‘expertise’ of 
sports governing bodies is overstated – at least in general terms. That their operations are 
related solely to a relatively narrow field does not of necessity make these bodies the 
custodians of complex information which a court cannot synthesise and understand. To 
treat sports governing bodies as akin to those organisations dealing in complex issues in 
the fields of science, technology, ethics and the like is to draw that classification too 
broadly. Sports governing bodies will undoubtedly have a great deal of knowledge and 
information about their sport, experience of its regulation and, in some instances, this will 
be complex, requiring the exercise of expert judgment. However, sport is essentially 
simple; indeed it depends upon simplicity for its success and popularity. The adoption of 
a uniform approach is unsustainable; the issues that arise will vary enormously in terms 
of complexity and demands on expertise in adjudication. The suspicion arises that, at its 
root, this approach is a result of judicial discomfort in dealing with sporting matters, 
perhaps succumbing to their “mystification”.74 Once established, the existence of 
precedent provides ample justification for perpetuating a position which limits judicial 
scrutiny. An instinctive response that a challenged measure is “perfectly sensible and 
fair” is more easily given effect by a low/no-intensity approach premised on institutional 
function and competence, than through a more difficult, higher-intensity analysis in 
72 On ‘deference’ and ‘restraint’ see J. Rivers, “Proportionality and variable intensity of review” [2006] 
65(1) C.L.J. 174. 
73 Collins pp.48-49. 
74 Moran at p. 92. 
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which the competing values must be identified and weighed.75 This perhaps reflects 
Professor Hugh Collins’ assertion that “club markets”, a term encompassing sports 
governing bodies, should be afforded a significant degree of autonomy by the courts, lest 
judicial intervention upset the delicate balance created therein.76 
 
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as it relates 
to the rules of sports governing bodies, demonstrates the capacity of that court to 
differentiate between factors involving the exercise of expertise and those in which the 
court may legitimately intervene.77 Indeed much of the Court of Justice’s attention – 
when dealing with cases involving sports regulators – has been directed to classifying the 
range of situations which might arise and the appropriate intensity of its scrutiny in each 
instance.78 In the particular field of competition law, the Court of Justice has developed 
an approach to ‘ancillary’ restraints which has been deployed in the context of sport in 
Meca-Medina v Commission.79 In particular the Court of Justice rejected the first instance 
judgment that as the issue of anti-doping regulation fell within the ‘sporting exception’ its 
evaluation was outwith the capacity of the court As such, the Court was able to undertake 
a balancing exercise strikingly akin to a proportionality review of the sort discussed 
below. Similarly, in Eastham the High Court demonstrated the capacity to distinguish 
between situations involving the exercise of specialist knowledge or expertise, where the 
court should deploy caution, and those where it might reasonably exercise more intense 
scrutiny: 
 
“The system is an employers’ system, set up in an industry where the employers 
have succeeded in establishing a united monolithic front all over the world, and 
where it is clear that for the purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more 
strongly organised than the employees. No doubt the employers all over the world 
consider the system a good system, but this does not prevent the court from 
75 T. Allen, “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” [2006] C.L.J. 671. 
76 At pp. 218-221. 
77 See e.g. Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belges des Sociètès de Football ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-
4192 at [76]-[77]. 
78 See R. Parrish and S. Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2008). 
79 Op cit, n.34. 
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considering whether it goes further than is reasonably necessary to protect their 
legitimate interests.” 80 
 
 
Fifth, litigation can serve a purpose greater than the adjudication of the individual case; it 
also permits communication between the judiciary and legislators and/or policy makers 
or, in this case, the regulator.81 A minor injustice inflicted on an individual may seem 
inconsequential when weighed against the interests of efficacious administration of a 
whole sport; however, the court is not just addressing the grievance of one individual, but 
is also effectively communicating to the defendant and, more likely, all sports governing 
bodies, the nature of their obligations and limitations. By refusing jurisdiction or limiting 
the intensity of review to too significant a degree, a court is effectively legitimising, and 
thus compounding, such injustices on a grand scale. The determination of the court is not 
limited in effect to the case immediately before it, but is likely to influence practise in all 
future instances of a similar nature. This emphasises the importance of litigation as an 
effective means of ‘negotiation’ between the parties.82 Seen in this light a claim can be 
perceived not only as one brought in support of the interests of the individual litigant, but 
also of the class of stakeholder to which they belong – Eastham is a good example of this. 
It should be emphasised that it is not only the ratio of cases which have this effect, obiter 
dicta can also have a significant impact in channelling the behaviours of sports 
regulators. A notable example of this is the litigation before the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 
Gundel v FEI.83 In a challenge to the International Equestrian Federation (FEI) it was 
argued that the Court of Arbitration for Sport lacked legally required standards of 
independence and impartiality. Though this claim was dismissed in the individual case, 
the court opined that the decision may have been different had the facts been subtly 
altered. The case resulted in the creation of an International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport (ICAS) to oversee the running and financing of the CAS and thus creating 
sufficient independence from the IOC, and which was demonstrated to be a suitable 
80 At 438. 
81 P-J. Yap, “Defending Dialogue” [2012] P.L. 527; R. Clayton, “Judicial deference and “democratic 
dialogue”: the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” [2004] P.L. 33, 42-43. 
82 G. Goodpaster, “Lawsuits as Negotiations” [1992] 8(3) Negotiation Journal 221. 
83 (1993) Swiss Federal Tribunal, 15 March. 
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response when the question arose subsequently.84 A similar instance can be found in 
domestic case law where the issue of an interim injunction on the basis that disciplinary 
procedures were arguably unlawful, prompted the Welsh Rugby Union to make 
amendments to its rules.85 
 
Sixth, this indirect impact of litigation assumes a greater importance than might be first 
imagined, given the increasing deployment of arbitration as a means of resolving claims 
against sports governing bodies. As noted above, the prevalence of arbitration over 
litigation in sports disputes has had the result that the frequency with which courts are 
provided with the opportunity to decide such cases, and to set out the applicable 
principles, is much reduced. The consequence is that those cases which do fall for judicial 
consideration obtain a significance stretching beyond the individual case – the principles 
set out therein will then be applied in subsequent arbitrations. The risk flowing from this 
is that a lack of clarity or detailed explanation of applicable principle will become 
genetically coded into subsequent arbitrations as it has into litigation. Building on the 
obiter dicta claim made above, it is not that the courts are likely to create direct precedent 
on the interpretation or application to be given to each and every situation; but that they 
have opportunities to develop and articulate general principle and to provide guidance on 
its application. 
 
Conclusions: proportionality as the next step? 
 
The adoption of a more overt, robust approach to the proportionality test is an ideal 
vehicle by which to address these demands for greater sophistication and transparency in 
the scrutiny of sports governing bodies.  
 
The effective deployment of the proportionality principle would amount to judicial 
recognition that the extent, impact and public nature of the powers and exercise of power 
by sports governing bodies, in the context of an accountability vacuum, necessitate a 
84 Lausutina v IOC and FIS, (2003) Swiss Federal Tribunal, 27 May. 
85Jones v Welsh Rugby Football Union (1997) The Times, 6 March; (1998) The Times, 6 January.  
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more nuanced judicial assessment and response. This is because the principle permits a 
more flexible approach than the test of rationality presently adopted. It permits the court 
to retain and reflect concerns relating to its expertise and the public interest in good 
administration, whilst overtly balancing the legitimate interests of the parties to the 
litigation.86  
 
The notion of proportionality as a free-standing ground for judicial review, outwith the 
context of human rights cases, is one which is gaining traction, with the 
acknowledgement in the Supreme Court that this is something with which the Court will 
have to grapple in the not too distant future.87 That this is the case, even given the 
constitutional constraints within which judicial review operates, it should be a relatively 
easy step to take for private law cases involving sports governing bodies to engage in a 
more vigorous assessment of the proportionality of a challenged measure. In this sense 
the private law case law is ahead of judicial review; it has already been recognised in 
Bradley and the cases which have followed that sports governing bodies are required to 
act proportionately. Nonetheless, as set out above, the articulation and application of the 
test in those cases was not explicit and lies at the state-limiting, rather than rights-
optimising end of the proportionality spectrum.88 
 
The nature of the proportionality principle in English law remains contested and is 
beyond the scope of this paper;89 nonetheless there appears to be a reasonable degree of 
consensus that it involves assessment by the court in the following terms: 
 
- the legitimacy of the pursued objective; 
- the suitability of the measure for achieving that objective; 
86 See R. (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 as an example of this in 
a regulatory context. 
87 See Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 at [271] per Lord 
Kerr; Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3 at [55] per Lord 
Carnwath. 
88 Rivers at 176. 
89 See, in particular, the problems with the proportionality principle highlighted in Lady Justice Arden, 
“Proportionality: the way forward?” [2013] PL 498 at 515. See also the challenges to proportionality as part 
of a judicial review framework in T. Hickman “Problems for Proportionality” [2010] NZLR 303, and J. 
King, “Proportionality: A Halfway House” [2010] NZLR 327. 
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- the necessity of the measure to achieve that objective; and  
- whether an appropriate balance is struck between the affected right and the 
interest pursued.90 
 
This systematic, structured approach would permit a court to address more overtly the 
balancing of the various factors regarded as apposite in the decision-making process. This 
was made plain by Lord Mance in Kennedy v Charity Commission (Secretary of State for 
Justice intervening): 
 
“The advantages of the terminology of proportionality [over reasonableness 
review] is that it brings structure into the exercise, by directing attention to factors 
such as suitability or appropriateness, necessity and the balance or imbalance or 
benefits and disadvantages.”91 
 
It is arguable that the existing, limited analysis of the detail of the proportionality 
principle in sports cases is a manifestation of judicial discomfort in reconciling demands 
for accountability with a desire to maintain the relative autonomy of sports governing 
bodies; or, perhaps, a sense that the principle underpinning the application is so obvious 
as to obviate the need for a fulsome explanation. Whatever the reason, the value of a full 
and explicit exposition of proportionality has been recognised recently by the Supreme 
Court; in Youssef Lord Carnwath indicated that a clear articulation of the approach to be 
adopted was desirable, not least to provide clarity for the lower courts.92 Though the 
context of challenge to sports governing bodies is significantly narrower than the general 
need for clarification of the principle, this does provide succour for the notion that greater 
judicial transparency in the articulation and application of the proportionality principle is 
desirable as a means of providing guidance to subordinate bodies – in this case sports 
arbitral tribunals – faced more frequently with the task of adjudication. It would also 
90 See the articulation of this by Lord Sumption in R (o/a Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, at [19]-[20], reflecting the approach adopted in Bank Mellat v 
HM Treasury(No.2) [2013] UKSC 39. 
91 [2014] UKSC 20, at [54]; see also Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Open Society 
Justice Initiative intervening) [2015] UKSC 19 at [96]; Bank Mellat (No.2) at [66] per Lord Reed. 
92 At [55]. 
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assist sports governing bodies in appreciating the demands upon them and thus lead to 
better governance. 
 
Similarly the adoption of this structured approach would necessarily involve a court in 
addressing, in its substantive analysis, the interests which have led to the development of 
a private law supervisory jurisdiction. This would meet the criticisms based on internal 
inconsistency, set out above. 
 
The approach suggested would undoubtedly address one major criticism outlined in this 
article, that of weak substantive review of sports governing bodies’ decision-making. 
Though the application of a proportionality principle might not compel courts to 
intervene more frequently, it would make the rationale for their position explicit. While 
the outcome of many cases would remain unaltered, the careful consideration required 
would prevent courts taking a ‘shortcut’ in their reasoning, deferring unduly to the 
expertise of the regulator or invoking the public interest, without overt consideration of 
competing interests which will produce more transparently just decisions. 
 
Such an approach could also be advanced as a means of addressing the other major 
criticism of the present approach, the lack of review of sports regulatory frameworks 
themselves. This would be a more significant development, in that it would take the 
courts into largely uncharted territory. However, given the adhesionary, legislative nature 
of these rules, that in many cases they are quasi-public in nature, and that there are 
limited – if any – other mechanisms for challenge, it is arguable that the extension of 
judicial oversight is appropriate. This would create some degree of parity between 
economic interests infringed by a regulatory scheme – subject to challenge through the 
restraint of trade doctrine, as in Eastham, and through statutory competition law 
provisions – and the non-economic interests already judicially acknowledged as being 
sufficient to give the courts jurisdiction. 
 
The approach advocated here is open to challenge on the basis that it would be too 
interventionist, frustrating the public interest in the effective administration of sport by 
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putting the courts in the place of the regulator. However, it is clear that the 
proportionality principle is not intended to be applied to effect a merits review, so as to 
permit the court to supplant the original decision- or rule-maker.93 The proportionality 
principle as it has been described in the English case law allows for a variable intensity of 
scrutiny, dependent on context.94 It is open to a court to take account of a variety of 
contextual factors – including the magnitude of the ‘right’ asserted and the nature of the 
measure under challenge – in determining the appropriate intensity of review in any 
given case. In the context of sport, as well as taking account of the sort of individual 
interests advanced in this article – participation, reputation, status, social inclusion and 
psychological well-being – it would be legitimate for a court to consider factors such as 
expertise and the wider public interest in determining how closely to scrutinise the 
legitimacy of any rule or decision. As outlined above, English courts have demonstrated 
the capacity to appreciate and accommodate such contextual factors in restraint of trade 
and competition law challenges to sports governing bodies; it would seem perverse to 
suggest that they lack the competence to assess these in the context of other cause of 
actions. 
 
It must also be emphasised that this proposed approach is not intended to extend the 
courts’ role beyond that of a supervisory one; but to buttress the effectiveness of judicial 
scrutiny such that the supervisory function is meaningful, responsive and suitably robust. 
In particular, this means that the approach should be sensitive to and more accurately 
reflective of the particular and peculiar sporting context in which it is applied. In doing so 
it needs to be ensured that there is adequate judicial reflection on the suitability and 
applicability of values and principles transplanted from the public law environs of 
judicial review. 
 
While the approach adopted in Bradley and developed since is to be welcomed as largely 
resolving the jurisdictional issues regarding sports governing bodies, this can only be 
regarded as a half-way house in securing appropriate levels of accountability for these 
93 See Bank Mellat (No.2) at [21] per Lord Sumption, and [71] per Lord Reed; Keyu at [133]-[134] per Lord 
Neuberger, and [272] per Lord Kerr. 
94 See, e.g. Kennedy at [51] per Lord Mance; Bank Mellat (No.2) at [69]-[70] per Lord Reed. 
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organisations. There exists a compelling case to believe that the courts can, and should 
exercise more searching scrutiny of sports governing bodies – both by more robust and 
overt application of existing principles in the case of decision-making and, as a general 
principle, by the extension of the existing supervisory jurisdiction as a means of testing 
the legitimacy of bodies’ rules and regulation. The emerging principle of proportionality 
should be deployed as an important instrument by which to secure suitable levels of 
scrutiny and accountability through the courts, whilst maintaining an appropriate degree 
of regulatory autonomy. 
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